

THE SOVIET SPECIAL PROPAGANDA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. TARGET: THE ROMANIAN ARMY

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Abstract. *The use of non-military means to achieve military and political goals has a long history. But each time, the tools to influence the emotional sphere of an enemy have been improved with the development of impact technologies and the emergence of new communication channels. Tasks such as demoralising the enemy, persuading to cease the armed struggle, motivating collaboration, were defined along with militant actions. The specialisation of this type of activity, the creation of appropriate authorities and the training of qualified personnel had been specified in the pre-war period and improved during the armed confrontation. The article targets one of the components of special propaganda focused on an enemy and its allies during the first period of the German-Soviet war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942). Printing and distributing leaflets was the most spread form of work with the enemy and its allies in the ideological branches of the Red Army. The specific features of the texts intended for enemy personnel and their allies were analysed through examples of leaflets addressed to Romanian soldiers and the Romanian Armed forces.*

Keywords: *The German-Soviet war, special propaganda, leaflets, Romanian armed forces.*

Rezumat: Propaganda specială sovietică în cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Obiectivul: Armata Română. *Utilizarea mijloacelor non-armate în vederea atingerii obiectivelor militare și politice are o istorie lungă. Numai că, de fiecare dată, instrumentele pentru influențarea sferei emoționale caracteristice inamicului au fost îmbunătățite pe măsura dezvoltării tehnologiilor de impact și a apariției unor noi canale de comunicare. Sarcini precum demoralizarea adversarului, persuasiunea cu scopul încetării luptei armate, motivarea colaborării au fost folosite deopotrivă cu acțiunile militare propriu-zise. Pregătirea temeinică a acestui tip de activitate, crearea conducătorilor potriviți și instruirea personalului calificat au fost inițiate în perioada premergătoare războiului și perfecționate*

în timpul confruntării armate. Articolul vizează una dintre componentele propagandei speciale, axate pe un anume inamic și pe aliații acestuia în prima etapă a războiului germano-sovietic (22 iunie 1941 – 18 noiembrie 1942). Tipărirea și distribuirea pliantelor a fost cea mai răspândită formă de activitate a diviziunilor ideologice ale Armatei Roșii în relația cu inamicul și aliații săi. Particularitățile intervenției asupra textelor adresate adversarului și susținătorilor lui sunt analizate prin exemplul pliantelor destinate soldaților români și care se referă la forțele Armatei Române.

Résumé: La propagande spéciale soviétique pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. L'objectif: l'Armée Roumaine. L'utilisation des moyens non-armées afin d'atteindre des objectifs militaires et politiques connaît une longue histoire. D'ailleurs, chaque fois, on améliora les instruments utilisés pour influencer la sphère émotionnelle de l'ennemi au fur et à mesure du développement des technologies d'impact et l'apparition de nouvelles chaînes de communication. On utilisa des tâches telles la démoralisation de l'adversaire, la persuasion au but de finir la lutte armée, la motivation de la collaboration ensemble aux actions militaires proprement dites. On initia dans la période antérieure à la guerre et on perfectionna pendant la confrontation armée la préparation sérieuse de ce type d'activité, la création des dirigeants appropriés et l'instruction du personnel qualifié. L'article ci-joint vise une des composantes de la propagande spéciale, axée sur un certain ennemi et sur ses alliés dans la première étape de la guerre allemande-soviétique (22 juin 1941 - 18 novembre 1942). La plus répandue forme d'activité des divisions idéologiques de l'Armée Rouge dans la relation avec l'ennemi et ses alliés fut l'impression et la distribution des pliants. On analysa, tout en utilisant l'exemple des pliants destinés aux soldats roumains et qui font référence aux forces armées roumaine, les particularités de l'intervention sur les textes adressés à l'adversaire et à ses souteneurs.

INTRODUCTION

Special propaganda of the Red Army was one of the most recent trends in political work during the Second World War. It began to form institutionally in 1938-1939 during the hostilities at Khalkhin-Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish war. It all started with the publication of newspapers in foreign languages. Then, a department of political operation among the enemy troops was created within the Main Political Department.¹ In 1940, the Soviet government introduced training courses for foreign language officers and political workers. In August

¹ А. Тихонов, *Слово тоже сражалось*, "Красная звезда", 30 апреля 2005 года [The word also fought], in http://old.redstar.ru/2005/04/30_04/2_01.html (Accessed on 20.11.2019).

1942, a department was formed within the Military Institute of Foreign Languages of the Red Army, which consisted of officers of political workers with knowledge of foreign languages. Two years later, a faculty and a department of special propaganda were organised.² At the beginning of the War, the Main Department for Political Propaganda of the Red Army was reorganised. Two new propaganda departments have been created. One department for operation with Germany and its allies, and the second one for operations with the population of countries occupied by Nazi Germany. During the war, the ideological institutions of the Red Army were reorganised following the needs of the war and the work on special propaganda was improved.³

On June 25, 1941, the fourth day of the German-Soviet war, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party decided to set up a Bureau of Political-Military Propaganda. The Bureau should have addressed the following issues:

- determine the ideological and political content of propaganda of the troops, citizens and prisoners of war of an enemy (separately for each country and army);
- elaborate, assign and approve the most important general policy documents of the Red Army and Navy, such as leaflets, slogans, appeals and brochures against enemy troops;
- manage the military councils and political institutions of the army and the navy in terms of political operation within the enemy forces;
- coordinate the Soviet propaganda authorities abroad, to create news agencies that would work with a foreign audience;
- cooperate with political emigration and leaders of foreign communist parties.⁴

² Д. Жуковская, *Политработа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War] in http://www.historicus.ru/politrabota_v_gody_voiny/ (Accessed on 20.11.2019)

³ С. И Репко, *Цена иллюзий. Пропганда на войска и население противника в первые месяцы войны* [The price of illusions. Propaganda on enemy troops and population in the first months of the war], in "Военно-исторический журнал", 1992, № 11, с. 8-15, in http://agitka.su/files/repko_vij.pdf (Accessed on 20.11.2019)

⁴ К. В. Крайнюков (ed.), *Партийно-политическая работа в Советских Вооруженных Силах в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945. Краткий исторический обзор* [Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Brief historical review], Москва, Воениздат, 1968, с. 524.

On the same day, a decision was made to issue leaflets and appeals to enemy troops regularly. An equally important issue was their distribution in the war zones. There were 66 types of various propaganda documents such as leaflets, slogans and appeals that were published during the first 12 days of the German-Soviet war. Ninety million copies were distributed in the areas of enemy troops and rear enemy dislocation zones. The newly set Bureau has developed political propaganda topics, theses and slogans against the enemy troops. During this period, more than 60 different topics of leaflets and slogans were approved.⁵

The 7th department became the working institution of the Bureau of Military-Political Propaganda, which was authorised by orders of the Bureau to inform the Bureau about the political and moral state of the enemy troops, changes in the troops and enemy's rear, elaborate propaganda documents, appeals to citizens, enemy troops and prisoners of war.⁶

After the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the conditions for special propaganda were improved, and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party created the Council for Military-Political Propaganda affiliated with the Main Political Department of the Red Army. This structure was responsible for summarising the experience and developing new recommendations for the effective impact on enemy troops and their allies. The set up of the Council has improved the quality of work with the agitprop print materials.⁷

In June of 1942, the Council developed and approved initiatives to improve the operations of military councils and political structures among enemy troops and their allies. The Council's decision mentioned that propaganda and agitation among the enemy must be based on factual elements and contain a differentiated approach to the peculiarities of enemy units and formations. The document said that figures and facts must support the explanation of Nazi Germany's commitment and the inevitability of its defeat.⁸ This approach meant that the activities directed against the specific representatives of the countries allied with Hitler's Germany required additional knowledge and skills. There was also a

⁵ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945)* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Москва, Воениздат, 1971, с. 29.

⁶ М. И. Бурцев, *Прозрение* [Disillusion], Москва, 1981, in http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/burtsev_mi/index.html (Accessed on 20.11.2019).

⁷ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа...*, с. 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 30.

problem with qualified translators. For operations with Allied military forces, special propaganda specialists were selected who spoke foreign languages. Captive collaborators have been involved in this work quite often.

THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTATION

The implementation of non-military means to achieve military-political goals has a long history. But each time, the means of influence on the emotional-volitive sphere of an enemy have improved with the development of simulation techniques and the emergence of new communication channels.

Modern researchers of information warfare consider various aspects of the non-military ways of affecting the enemy's behaviour to break down the enemy from within, followed by a refusal to continue the armed struggle and minimise the use of their forces and possible losses. We can say that the concept of "information warfare" is multidimensional. Following the goals of influencing people in different historical periods by the representatives of various scientific movements, information warfare was divided into propaganda, counter-propaganda, special propaganda, psychological warfare, misinformation etc. According to Russian researcher G. Zhirkov, hierarchs, monarchs, kings, leaders, state and party bureaucrats have constantly improved methods of interacting with the masses and their influence.⁹

The experience of propaganda activities of the military-ideological institutions of the countries participating in the Second World War remains a research object for the representatives of many scientific branches, from historians to political scientists. Today, there is no agreement on the possibility of achieving military-political goals without the use of weapons, only subject to an informational and psychological impact. Indeed, according to the American researcher Philip Taylor, "Words cannot win wars, but they can smooth the path of victory. Nor can they disguise defeat".¹⁰ And propaganda is already considered not only as a separate technology but as a set of events with a specific purpose and methodology to influence different segments of the target audience.

⁹ Г. В. Жирков, *Предисловие* [Foreword], in Н. Л. Волковский, *История информационных войн* [History of information wars], В 2-х ч., Ч. 1, Санкт Петербург, ООО Издательство "Полигон", 2003, с. 3.

¹⁰ Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind. A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era*. Third Edition, Manchester – New York, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 240.

Before the Second World War, the General Political Administration was established in the USSR.

The military-ideological authority served as ideological sabotage. And today, many aspects of its activities are not available for research. Propaganda is based on identifying target audience segments with appropriate methodology and infrastructure. During the Second World War, the concept of political propaganda or political work emerged. It was a propaganda activity aimed at supporting the actions of its government and criticising the actions of the military and political leaders of the enemy. In Great Britain and the USA, ideological structures were engaged in white and black propaganda. F. Taylor said “The Americans also distinguished between black and white propaganda. For this purpose, they set up two separate organisations, black material being dealt with by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and white by the Office of War Information (OWI).¹¹

Moreover, Edmund Gullion is a newly-minted Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts. He confessed that he liked to use the term “propaganda” but was too aware of its negative connotation for U.S. audiences. He eventually settled on a form of words that were used from time to time to describe a variety of information practices: public diplomacy.¹²

The different interpretation of the same phenomenon was caused by the historical experience in the practical use of political propaganda and direct participation in the battles of World War II. In countries that have experienced the German occupation, such phenomena are perceived in a slightly different way. Therefore, intentional, aggressive and systematic Soviet propaganda was not considered relevant in the United States and could be interpreted as certain communication practices. It stands to reason that, after all, Nazi plans for the Soviet Union, although more ambitious, were far more thought out than those for Western Europe.¹³

German historian Christian Hartman traced the path of five German divisions as part of Army Group Centre: from Bialystok, Brest, Lviv and Kyiv. The scientist emphasises that the Nazis aimed at “exploiting, enslaving and destroying

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹² Nicholas J. Cull, *Roof for a House Divided: How U.S. Propaganda Evolved into Public Diplomacy*, in Jonathan Auerbach, Russ Castronovo (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 144.

¹³ Ben Shepherd, [Review–Article] *The Nazi Occupation of the Soviet Union 1941–4: Exploitation and Propaganda*, in “English Historical Review”, Volume CXXVI, 2011, Issue 519, p. 387.

the Soviet society, creating strategic and economic world domination of the Great German Reich, destroying” ideological enemies – “Jewry and Bolshevism”.¹⁴ For the German historian, there is no doubt that from the very beginning “it was a racial-ideological war of extermination”, that “the entire initiative in unleashing the war belonged to Germany.”¹⁵ In his studies, he noted the difficulties of conducting ideological work. But, on the other hand, it was these circumstances that fit the propaganda of the Red Army.

Thus, harsh weather conditions, an underdeveloped infrastructure and a supply disruption, the frightening loss of men and equipment among the front-line units, the poor quality and quantity of troops assigned to the occupation units, and the deteriorating fighting power of both, all played an essential role, along with ideology and other factors, which shaped the behaviour of these units in different contexts and at different times.¹⁶

It is necessary to consider the fact that Hitler’s Germany turned out to conduct powerful ideological pressure on both the Red Army and the citizens of the USSR. The German researcher Babette Quinkert argues that propaganda aimed at occupied Soviet citizens, coupled with the capacity to distinguish between the Soviet Union’s different nationalities, was a more important facet of the Nazi occupation than had previously been acknowledged.¹⁷

Finally, the distribution of propaganda was a major problem throughout the entire occupation period. It was severely hindered by distances, terrain and increasing partisan disruption. While Quinkert argues that the place of propaganda within the Nazi occupation needs greater recognition, she does not eliminate the importance of terror either.¹⁸ This connection between terror and propaganda is essential in understanding the dynamics of the German policy in occupied areas of the East.

It must be taken into account that from the first days of the war, the highest party leadership of the USSR and the ideological institutions of the army paid the same attention to political propaganda as to military operations. According to Philip Taylor, the propaganda influence begins with determining the status of the war, which is embedded in its name. However, Soviet propaganda warfare is

¹⁴ Christian Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg. Front und militarisches Hinterland 1941/42*. Munchen, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009. p. 469.

¹⁵ Christian Hartmann, *Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941-1945*, Munchen, 2011, p. 111.

¹⁶ Ben Shepherd, [Review–Article] *The Nazi Occupation of the Soviet Union...*, p. 394.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

better known. Even today, the Soviets describe the Second World War as 'The Great Patriotic War'. In many respects, patriotism was more significant than propaganda, and certainly, the propaganda was rather aimed at patriotic resistance than ideological or revolutionary change.¹⁹ The war became nationwide, and the patriotism of the citizens of the USSR was the driving force both on the fronts and at the rear. The war was presented as a conflict between two ideologies. The brutality of the Nazi invaders was never avoided; indeed, the hellish reality of the war was a distinctive feature of the Soviet art of war.²⁰

The role of media was decisive in propaganda during World War II. The military-political leadership of the USSR exercised total control over information flows. Russian researcher N. Volkovsky called the press a piano in the hands of the government.²¹ There have been situations when propaganda has had many meanings. Its domain may vary from intentional communication, which indicates a particular ideological or partisan sensitivity, to virtually provide meaning to any verbal or visual expression of identity or opinion.²²

In the pre-war period and during the Second World War, a set of historically unprecedented options and parameters was established that would support propaganda to operate against both enemies and allies, both nationally and internationally.²³ In the view of the ideological organs of the Red Army, propaganda pursued two main goals: raising the morale of its own soldiers and demoralising the enemy troops.

Special propaganda, as an integral part of the entire political work of commanders and political authorities, included, as mentioned, three interrelated courses: political operations among enemy troops, political operations among the citizens of enemy countries and countries occupied by the Nazis and political operations among prisoners of war. Each of these courses was intended to demoralise an enemy utilising propaganda and agitation, strengthen the processes of decay of its front and rear, and propagate the military successes of the Red Army persuading the soldiers and citizens of the enemy countries on the imminence of defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.²⁴

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

²⁰ Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind...*, p. 237.

²¹ Н. Л. Волковский, *История информационных войн...*, с. 191.

²² Michele Hilmes, *The new vehicle of nationalism: radio goes to war. Propaganda studies*, in Jonathan Auerbach, Russ Castronovo (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 201.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

²⁴ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа...*, с. 25.

The most widespread form of print propaganda was the leaflet. Small content of an understandable text, a hot topic, a suitable name, or a slogan, progressive presentation of information with a final appeal to certain actions was meant to attract enemy soldiers and officers to read them. The leaflets were “operational”, “informational” and “general political”.²⁵ The leaflets published by the Chief Political Departments of the Army and Navy were generally political. Such leaflets covered ideological and political issues, international conditions, the course of the war, its prospects, the state of Hitler’s Germany. They were distributed to all areas of the front.

The leaflets published by the political departments of the armies and divisions, as well as the political directorate of the fronts, were considered to be operational. They disclosed the operational state of separate units at a particular sector of the front in a specific period. These leaflets reflected specific stories, the life of soldiers, their relationship with commanders. The combination of general political and operational leaflets was considered to be an achievement of the special propaganda. All the leaflets for the Allied armies soldiers were divided into five main types: official statements, speeches and documents, informational leaflets, leaflets containing letters and appeals of prisoners of war and leaflets-slogans.²⁶

Political operations among enemy troops were a growing trend and became widespread by the end of the war. Thereby, during the German-Soviet war, more than 20,000 designations of propaganda literature in 20 foreign languages were published and distributed with a total circulation of 2 billion 706 million copies. Among them, there were 10 million copies of newspapers, 10.2 million copies of agitation brochures. Another vast majority contained leaflets and appeals.²⁷

Leaflets and appeals were considered to be effective weapons in the war. Why has so much attention been paid to their work by the ideological authorities of the Red Army? As it results from analysing the goals and objectives of the special propaganda, an operation carried out among the Nazi allies troops was a means of moral and psychological impact to obtain the victory of the Red Army

²⁵ К. В. Крайнюков (ed.), *Партийно-политическая работа...*, с. 526.

²⁶ *Оружием правды. Листовки к войскам и населению противника, изданные политорганами Советской Армии и Военно-Морского Флота во время Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 годов* [The weapon of truth. Leaflets to the enemy troops and population, published by the political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Москва, Воениздат, 1971, с. 15-21.

²⁷ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 23.

over the adversary forces with minimal losses.²⁸ This activity was carried out under the conditions of the military-political situation.

In the defensive stage of the first period of war (June 22, 1941-November 18, 1942), the main task of special propaganda was to thoroughly shatter the offensive spirit of enemy troops, weaken the influence of the Nazi ideology, and deface the military successes of the enemy. In the second period of the war (November 19, 1942-1943), upon the victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad, the main thing was to deepen the process of moral and psychological decay of the enemy, including allies, in order to promote the conditions of Soviet captivity and to make them surrender.

In the third period of the war (19 November 1942 - December 1943), the main task of the special propaganda was the appeal to the enemy soldiers and officers to surrender themselves and the units that were surrounded. Successes on the frontlines primarily determined the success of ideological influence.²⁹

Propaganda among enemy troops, especially in the first period, was of a class nature and was widespread both in terms of social purpose and target audience. This research paper considers the original samples of leaflets of the first period of the German-Soviet war, which were prepared for the Romanian soldiers to motivate them to act against the Germans and I. Antonescu. An example of a leaflet addressed to the Soviet troops, defacing the Romanian Armed forces is provided.

LEAFLETS ADDRESSED TO THE ROMANIAN SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS

The leaflets discussed in the article referred to generally political ones. Such leaflets should have contained accurate facts and events about the life of the Romanian soldiers on the frontline, and that of their relatives left behind. Such information was obtained after careful research of the trophy documents and during the interrogation of prisoners of war. The style of such leaflets needed to meet the requirements of figurative, literary and artistic forms of presentation of the material. The language of such leaflets had to be clear and at the same time logical.

Leaflets intended for Romanian soldiers had to be composed in Romanian. But translated copies into Russian were sent to authorities for a report. This fact

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27, 30.

was stated in the upper left corner of leaflets informing that the copies were provided for reference.

In the process of work on the texts, facts from interrogations of Romanian prisoners of war and quotes from military orders were used. This method should have contributed to increasing the authenticity of the written texts.

This leaflet is made on newsprint and contains the required target elements. At the bottom of the text, there is a pass in Romanian and Russian, so that it could be understood by Romanian soldiers who decided to surrender and for the Soviet military, as well. Attention is drawn to the highlighted call to read and hand over the leaflet to a “comrade”. This element is specific for leaflets intended for the Red Army, as it contains elements of the class approach. It is unlikely that Romanian soldiers were able to understand the meaning of the word “comrade” call unless they were communists.

The ideological operation among personnel of the Nazi ally troops was initially based on the class approach. Appeals were often made to understand the imperialist nature of the war and to defect to the Red Army. It did not usually resonate with the target audience.

This leaflet (see *Annexe 1*) is an appeal to the Transylvanian Romanians, who were forced to fight for the Hungarian troops on the side of Nazi Germany. The military ideologists of the Red Army estimated all social and political contradictions.³⁰

At the beginning of the text, their compatriot and prisoner of war Dumitru Medan, who was a soldier of the 5th company of the 35th Hungarian regiment, made an appeal to the Romanian soldiers. This perspective immediately established credibility and drew attention. He appealed to his compatriots saying that Hungary was fighting for the Germans, and the Hungarian rulers sold themselves to Hitler. But why should a Romanian die for Hitler and the Hungarian lords who oppress the Romanians? The sentence is written in bold type and immediately attracts attention. The main message of these words is that Transylvanian Romanians die for the Hungarians and Hitler. The text indicates the

³⁰ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України [**Hereinafter: ЦДАГО України**], Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 484 (Листівка “К трансильванским румынам венгерской армии”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 484 (Leaflet “To the Transylvanian Romanians of the Hungarian army!”)].

enemies. This problem was the main for all Transylvanian Romanians. The Soviet Army ideologists took advantage of this to influence Romanian soldiers with the subsequent motivation to put an end to the armed struggle.

Further in the text, there is a sentence written in ordinary font type stating that there was no reason for the Romanians to die in Russia because the Russians have never been enemies of the Romanians. And as a consequence of the mentioned statement, the slogan is highlighted in bold font type: "Your enemies are the Germans and the Hungarians!" The sequence of designated enemies has been changed in this sentence. At the beginning of the text, the Hungarians were the enemies first mentioned, and now the Germans come first. But such a change in emphasis is not accidental; it is necessary for further argumentation. The authors of the leaflet wrote that the Germans invaded Northern Transylvania and gave it to the Hungarians. And the Hungarians rob and oppress the Romanian citizens, kill their women and children. Further, the audacity of the Hungarians' approach towards the Romanians is shown.

The authors of the leaflet used an important theme of a family, the insecurity of relatives, which has always struck men in war because of their inability to protect relatives. It also refers to the robberies of farms and the export of everything valuable to Germany. It all led to the statement that Hungarians treat Romanians worse than they treat their cattle. And there is no limit to the humiliation of Romanians in the Hungarian army. In this case, there is a transfer of rhetoric from the actions of the Nazis in the USSR to the actions of the Hungarians in Northern Transylvania.

The following paragraph contains a special order No. 3607/M1 of the Hungarian General Staff on the Transylvanian Romanians. A fragment of the mentioned order states in bold letters: "deceit, thievish, shallowness, laziness, craftiness, herd instinct and low mental level". This sentence in Russian conveys the use of the Russian mentality set to aim the attention of the reader on their demeaning condition. This text in bold is a continuation of that super text, it is immediately noticeable, even if the entire leaflet is not read. The enemies and their attitude towards the enslaved Romanians are defined and described as such. Everything else is for confirmation.

In addition to the use of trophy documents (such as the order mentioned above), there is also one figure that is indicated in the leaflet – 30% of the Transylvanian Romanians who fight for the Hungarians. There is nothing to confirm this figure, and it most likely acts as amplified propaganda which claimed that the Hungarians fought using Romanian blood and the list of places of their death during militant actions. After the presentation of the information,

there is a call to pay attention to how many personnel remain in the Romanian units. As an answer - the phrase in bold font: "Death awaits each of you at the front!". It is not just written text; it has a voice. This menace is the apogee of everything mentioned in the text.

Then there is a sentence, which consists of several parts that have different time sequences: "So, let every one of you decide, at this last moment, when you faced death before it is too late ..." The quote "faced death" is already in the past tense. However, it looks like it is not too late, by the present tense of "let every one of you decide" what to do in the future. As in tragic plays, there is a "heat of the moment" and then the ending where two exits are offered. They are in bold in the form of a poetic stanza. Either die for Horthy and Hitler or save your life, save yourself for your family. And to do so, one must leave the Germans and Hungarians and defect to the Russians, who are the friends. And then the gaps are posted.

Analysing the text of this leaflet in the Russian version, we can say that rather writers than propagandists worked on it. The text is composed in such a way that there is a progressive perception of the topic with an aggravation of the plot, of the imminence of death and the opportunity to take advantage of the proposal to stay alive. The text of the leaflet contains speech patterns specific to the Russian language. Therefore, no mechanical translation will provide readers with an understanding of the difficult position of the Transylvanian Romanians, but a specialist should have done translation to convey the entire emotional nuance of the text in Romanian. By genre, this text looks more like a literary essay with a corresponding appeal. It is not brief, not always concrete, overfilled with slogans. Since it was forbidden for all troops to collect, read and store enemy leaflets, the chances to read the entire text were minimal. That is why key phrases in bold formed an over text that could be grasped right away.

Another sample of a leaflet (see *Annexe 2*) is a translation of a text prepared for Romanian soldiers and officers into Russian ³¹. Based on the likely incompleteness of the text, we can conclude that the second page has not been preserved, so the other two necessary elements - a pass for surrender and the slogan on the need to read and pass this leaflet to a "comrade", are absent. This copy contains an appeal to the Romanian soldiers to determine their fate. A. Hitler and I. Antonescu were identified as their main enemies. The text of the leaflet was composed as reporting about the imminent death of Nazi Germany and Romania,

³¹ ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 482 (Листівка 'Как кончить войну!') [File 482 (Leaflet "How to End the War!")].

which is enslaved. Some fatalism is also present in the title: "How to End the War", which is marked out with bigger print. Without a question mark, but with an exclamation mark, this interrogative sentence turns into a statement-answer.

The authors of the leaflet immediately identify the target audience in their appeal: "Romanian soldiers! Officers!". In this case, this is an important fact for understanding the German army hierarchy. The appeal to the enemy's personnel is not based on the class approach of the Soviet ideology but takes into account the traditions of the armies of the countries - allies of Germany.

The first paragraph refers to signing the treaty between Russia and England on a military alliance against Germany and its accomplices in Europe on May 25, 1942. This information assumes that the leaflet is of 1942 issue. A stylistic approach, such as mitigation is noteworthy. It is not about the allies of Hitler's Germany, to which Romania belonged, which determined the legally correct status. It speaks about accomplices, which significantly softens the perception of the opponent's responsibility. This approach would not turn off the Romanian soldiers, but motivate them to read further. And further, it says that a military agreement between Russia and America would be signed in less than a month.

Then, as part of the progressive presentation of the information, the following question was asked: "What does this mean for Nazi Germany?" The conclusion in bold letters indicates its imminent defeat. Further, the answer to this question is detailed by the facts. The number of states opposing Nazi Germany is listed, the numbers intending to show the power and inaccessibility of the coalition of member-countries against Germany and its allies. They progressively show that these countries have much more land and population and that they produce much more industrial goods and food.

An interesting fact is that the text estimates the capabilities of Russia, England and the USA in the third person, and not in the propaganda tone for any of them. It is said, "not us, but they can put ten of their soldiers against a German one, four of their tanks against a German one". The same thing is said about guns and aircraft. These phrases are in bold letters. And the apotheosis almost sounds like the words by which A. Hitler pulled the Romanians and their unfortunate country into the War against this powerful force with the hands of I. Antonescu.

Such type of stylistic device was used when all responsibility for participating in the war on the side of the invaders was transferred to one conductor-person. In the next sentence, the figure is distinguished - 400,000 Romanians have already paid with their lives for the crimes of A. Hitler and I. Antonescu. The following two sentences are drawn up in the framework of the stamps adopted in the Soviet propaganda, which amplifies the preliminary

statement. These are simple sentences contributing to a visualisation of the described events: Romanian blood flows and the daily mountains of bodies of Romanian soldiers and, as a result, thousands of widows and orphans. The next phrase in bold letters looks like a verdict. Keeping the struggle on the side of Hitler means death for Romania. Next is the beginning of an unfinished phrase, that the English-Soviet treaty is a way out for Romanian soldiers. Even without continuation, it can be said that this leaflet, in comparison with the previous one, is more aligned with the style of small forms of agitation. The material presentation ranges from macro events of geopolitical nature to micro-events concerning the participation of every Romanian soldier in the War and the opportunity of saving lives. The gradual perception of the text filled with literary techniques makes it possible to perceive the content as the tragic fate of the Romanian soldiers, deceived by their lords, who served Hitler.

Unlike the previous leaflet, the selected phrases of this text do not constitute a super text that can be quickly grasped unless it is possible to read the entire leaflet carefully. The highlight of words and sentences was used to emphasise individual thoughts while reading the entire leaflet. The authors of the leaflet assumed its full reading, which was doubtful in the face of combat activity.

The following sample of leaflets (see *Annexe 3*) addressed to Romanian soldiers is written in poetic form³². The leaflet is unilateral, made on newsprint with the usual attributes. There is an inscription (a note) in the upper left corner that shows it is a translation from Romanian into Russian. Below the text, there are gaps in Russian and Romanian. The call “Read it and pass it on to a comrade” is missing from the leaflet. The Soviet military ideologists already understood that if a leaflet has a pass-it-on note, it is, in fact, target-focused. That means there is an inclination to surrender for anyone who reads this leaflet. And the inscription suggests handing over the text with a pass to another reader.

The leaflet contains a letter from a Romanian woman named Anika (Rom. perhaps Anica, Anuța or Anuca) to her husband, Ion, who served in the army under the command of I. Antonescu. The wife complains to her husband about the difficult life under the German occupation. She says that the Germans are mocking helpless farmers, taking livestock, robbing and destroying everyone. She also worries about her husband’s life. Therefore, the last four separate lines of the poem show that Ion could not stand it and deserted at night.

³² ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 483 (Листівка “Письмо от жены румынскому солдату на фронт”) [File 483 (Leaflet “A letter from the wife of a Romanian soldier to the front)].

The poem can be called sarcastic with fictional characters. It is well perceived in Russian. Stylistics and separate phraseological units, for example, such as "... damned Germans mock us, defaming soldiers, take oxen", are peculiar to the Russian-speaking reader. It is doubtful whether this poem can be adequately translated into Romanian. Firstly, we can assume that the translation was done into the Romanian language with the preservation of all literary forms, and experts made it the literary translation. Secondly, if the poem was translated, most likely it was automatically, without preserving the character and stylistic features of the Romanian language, which significantly reduced the degree of tension during reading. Nevertheless, it is more likely that this leaflet was presented for report or approval only.

The next sample (see *Annexe 4*) is a newsletter (report) with serial number 384. The issue date is September 30, 1941.³³ The report was intended to be put in navy newspapers. This report is issued by the Press Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Navy in Moscow according to the output after the text. The address of the printing house, reference number and surnames of an author and a responsible editor are indicated. The title of the Bulletin material is brief: "What's on the mind of the Romanian soldiers and sailors?" In this case, methodological material for conducting information and communication events among the Red Army soldiers is considered. This issue is dedicated to the participation of the Romanian Armed forces in the war and is intended for sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.

The text contains a detailed analysis of the social and political situation in Romania before and during the War. It is backed up by the Romanian captive soldiers and quotes from trophy documents of the Romanian command. This text is not intended for Romanian soldiers. We consider it a full-fledged propaganda article that is recommended for distribution and discussion among Red Army soldiers, displaying a gradual presentation of the material, simple and understandable speech, numerous specifics made the text receptive. From the very beginning of the text, the situation before the War and the role of I. Antonescu in involving Romania in alliance with Germany is given. The emphasis is made on the actions of the Germans, who occupied the territory, took control over oilfields and financial institutions.

³³ ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 43 (Листівка "О чем думают румынский солдат и матрос?") [File 43 (Leaflet "What are the Romanian soldiers and sailors thinking about?")].

The Romanians were told about the liberation war for three weeks with promises of obtaining land. The text refers to the treacherous nature of actions of the Romanian leadership. It seems that they were promised the inclusion of Romania in the new system of Nazi Europe. But, according to the text, Romania was given the role of a natural-resource base. According to the tradition of propaganda text, the peoples of Romania were separated from the military-political leadership. The image of I. Antonescu as an enemy was created. And that it was he who dragged the Romanians into the bloody war. Such conclusions should have been supported by pieces of evidence from prisoners of war. Therefore, the leaflet contains the testimony of the Romanian soldier Kurku (probably, in Romanian, Curcă) and officer Zaveru, that no one knew the reason and purpose of the War and did not want to fight. Moreover, in his testimony, the soldier Ponzyak is candid about their promised plots of land after the liberation of Bessarabia.

Gradually, the topic moves towards relations and subordination between the German and Romanian military. First, as the soldier Peredescu (correctly, in Romanian, Predescu) testifies, they were promised that the Romanian troops would move around the German units. But the Germans “propelled” the Romanians ahead, and those who retreated were shot. Therefore, the Romanians were used as cannon fodder. Second, according to the author, the Germans treated the Romanian soldiers without respect. Disrespect and humiliation contributed to the escalation of interpersonal relations in the military environment. Even on the Romanian command side, orders were issued about the necessity to keep the normal drill. Third, the Romanian military leaders themselves made a disappointing assessment of the military capabilities of their personnel. The text quoted the order No. 81 of Colonel Semionescu, which states that the Romanian soldiers are cowards, they are afraid of bullets, aircraft and artillery fire, even at low intensity. The trophy headquarters reports cited here refer to cases of desertion and suicide among the Romanian soldiers. The propaganda author makes a statement about the demoralisation of the Romanian army related to the situation in the rear front, as a conclusion of the text. High food prices, industry destroyed by Soviet aviation and high death rate at the front cause confusion among the country’s population. The German units exercise police functions, and I. Antonescu begins to call older people into the Army. According to the author, Romania is in a difficult situation. And the Black Sea defenders must inflict heavy losses to demoralise the Romanian Army completely.

The analysis shows that this was a pure propaganda text that was written correctly without unnecessary deviations from the content. The statement of facts

is combined with the emotionally filled evidence of Romanian prisoners of war. Their testimonies are embedded in the text in a single literary style. The translated version of these testimonies of prisoners of war was likely drawn up to meet the requirements of the Soviet propaganda document.

On the one hand, the Romanians are described as deceived and humiliated by the Germans; on the other hand, their role as a serious enemy is beyond doubt. These perceptions were the reason for writing such material for further discussion. It was necessary to motivate the Soviet troops not to be afraid of the Romanian Army, to fight them in order to break them from the inside, demoralise and make them incapable of continuing military operations. The author manages to successfully maintain the balance between the need to prove the insolvency of the Romanian troops as an equal adversary and an effective German ally, with the admission of the real strength and capabilities of the Romanian Armed forces, which must be fought hard. The archival document itself serves as evidence.

Although this archival document speaks of its role as information material for the Soviet military, it is likely that the facts and evidence stated in the text were used in other leaflets addressed to the Romanian soldiers. We refer to the versatile use of the facts collected with a corresponding ideological tinge.

An important role in the ideological pressure on Romanian soldiers was given to the religious factor. In Eastern Europe, where borders have rarely been firmly fixed and where the political affinities of populations have been highly changeable, religion has been one tool, often the principal one, to ensure the loyalty, or at least submission, of subjects.³⁴ The Russian Orthodox Church held the dominant position because this Church possessed the assets the Soviets needed to deal with their political and diplomatic tasks.³⁵

More cleverly, the Soviet Union also sought to sow disunity in the ranks of the Nazi coalition by cultivating Romanian-Hungarian discord. To this end, the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation adopted the slogan "Romanians! Defend your land from Hungarian invasion, struggle for the return of northern Transylvania, given by Hitler to Hungary."³⁶ The Russian Orthodox Church has done its part by appealing to the people of the Balkans. On November 22 and December 9, 1942, the Metropolitans Sergii and Nikolai launched two appeals to the "Brothers in Faith! Soldiers of the Romanian Army." "The metropolitans

³⁴ Steven Merritt Miner, *Stalin's Holy War. Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 15.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

reprimanded Romanian soldiers for participating in Hitler's aggressive war against the "peaceful Orthodox Russian people" and fellow Orthodox believers. The Nazis had fantasised about conquering the world, but "The powerful alliance of Russia, America, and England is squeezing fascist Germany and its vassals in a ring ... and the hour of fascism's defeat is not distant." "Finally," the metropolitans declared "the Romanian soldier must not forget the state independence and (...) a holy hatred toward the enemy."³⁷

The idea that National Liberty and the existence of Romania was obtained by the blood of Russian soldiers in the war of 1877-1878 was played out. Therefore, the conclusion-slogan was unconditional: the Romanian people are forever indebted to Russia. The metropolitans expressed their arguments in Christian terms: "Your military and Christian duty are not to die for the Germans, whose fault pours the blood of your homeland and exposes your people to endless suffering. The Christian duty is to immediately leave the German ranks and go over to the Russian side, thereby atoning for sin."

The appeals were carefully timed to coincide with the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942. The texts of the leaflets were printed in Romanian in the form of propaganda leaflets.

The American researcher Steven Merritt Miner regrets that it is impossible to find out about the effects of the appeals of the Orthodox hierarchs. But, in his opinion, for the first time, Soviet propaganda was ready to issue appeals to a foreign audience in clear Christian terms, and such calls were used by the most important events in the military field.³⁸ The appeals to Romanian soldiers indicated the direction that Soviet propaganda and church policy were heading; in the spring of 1943, the church's role in foreign policy would become much more prominent.³⁹

It is necessary to note one more trick of the Soviet special propaganda. Stalin's public statements always ignored the presence in the Soviet territory of citizens of states allied with Germany. He thought, probably correctly, that his citizens preferred to conceive of the enemy as one. Famous Soviet writer I. Ehrenburg once made this explicit. He wrote: "We do not add anything to the oath 'Death to the German occupiers,'" because Italian, Romanian, Finnish, Spanish, French, and Belgian hirelings were "not representatives of other

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

peoples.” They were “the very same German occupiers, ‘second rate.’”⁴⁰ Still, non-German invaders were mentioned and to varying degrees included in the campaign for hate. Romanians had been denigrated for years, and in the middle of 1940, the Soviet media raged against “Romanian boyars and gendarmes” oppressing Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.⁴¹ The rhetoric regarding the atrocities of the Romanian army against the Jews was comparative.

Concerning the Romanian soldiers, political propaganda was of a multi-vector nature. The contradictions between Romanians and Hungarians were used. The religious theme was exaggerated. Class approaches were used. Romanian soldiers and the Romanian people were divided by the government of I. Antonescu and received the role of a deceived martyr. The propaganda materials used the contradictions that arose as a result of the unequal position as an ally of the Nazis.

In the context of this study, it is also necessary to speak about the use of the anti-Semitic theme against the Romanian troops. The rhetoric regarding the atrocities of the Romanian army against the Jews in Odesa was comparative with Babi Yar in Kyiv and Drobitsky Yar near Kharkiv. But, in August 1944, when the King of Romania, Michael, adopted a truce in the Soviet Union it was at a time when anti-Romanian propaganda stopped abruptly.⁴²

Leaflets were only one direction of the special propaganda of the Red Army. Periodicals for the Romanian soldiers were also issued. In addition to such activities as working with prisoners of war, the creation of collaborative structures between prisoners of war camps has been practised. Work was carried out separately with each of these target audiences⁴³.

These measures were taken to create conditions where soldiers, their families, and the entire population of Hitler’s allied country would cease to support their state leadership and strive to end the war on the side of Germany.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the above leaflet copies leads to the following conclusions:

1. The work with the texts was the subject of great attention from the ideological structures of the Red Army responsible for conducting special

⁴⁰ Karel C Berkhoff, *Motherland in danger. Soviet propaganda during World War II*, Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 90.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 194-195.

propaganda. Professional writers who were involved have not always maintained brevity and objectivity in the texts of leaflets, which are based on a careful reading of the printed by the target audience. In the first period of the War, such a situation was unlikely.

2. The stylistics of writing intended for Romanian soldiers mainly corresponded to Soviet ideological clichés. A high-quality translation into Romanian, preserving the emotional component and motivational messages was a condition for adequate perception of leaflets by the Romanians. The possibility of this is doubtful.

3. The purpose of the leaflets was their contribution to the demoralisation of Romanian soldiers and motivating them to stop participating in the War. The use of various literary genres and stylistics is effective in Russian. Although in each leaflet copy it is said that this is a translation from Romanian, there is a doubt that the Romanian version of these leaflets was written first.

4. The interest is taken in the last example that was drawn for the Soviet soldiers as if it is about the collapse of the Romanian Army. The last phrase informing about the necessity to inflict crushing hits to demoralise the Romanian Army testifies that the main role in maintaining the moral and psychological state of the Romanians was allotted to real events on the fronts. And the period of this leaflet issue was characterised by the victorious advance of the Nazi troops and their allies throughout the USSR territory.

5. Taking into account the fact that all the leaflets were printed in the rear frontline, probably in the capital's printing house, we can conclude that there was a well-established centralised system of working with texts, printing, delivery and distribution at the locations of the Romanian troops.

6. Despite all these disadvantages, we should keep in mind that this work of issuing and distributing leaflets among the enemy troops and their allies was carried out in conditions of fierce military confrontation, the constant movement of fronts and powerful ideological countermeasures by the relevant enemy institutions.

This kind of propaganda (experience) is extremely important in the modern military conflicts when forms of confrontation spiral into non-military clashes and the information and communication component becomes of the same importance with the military one to achieve military and political goals. No matter how overwhelming the availability of the Internet may be, however, in the absence of electricity, the inability to pay for the Internet or the absence of appropriate gadgets, the printed word remains a decisive factor in the exercise of information and psychological influence on the enemy. Soviet special propaganda has been an

inaccessible topic for a long time. Only with the opening of the archives and the possibility of a free study of historical sources, the opportunity to study this line of activity of the ideological structures of the Red Army arose.

Annexe 1

4р 56 041/224 784

Институт истории Украины
Фонд «История народно-воинской
при КС КСРС
ПАРТАРХИВ

Перевод с румынского
в целях информации

К ТРАНСИЛЬВАНСКИМ РУМУНАМ ВЕНГЕРСКОЙ АРМИИ!

Трансильванцы-румыны! Почитайте, что говорит пленный Думитру Медан, солдат румын 5-й роты, 35-го венгерского полка. Он заявил: «Венгрия воюет за немцев. Венгерские правители продались Гитлеру. Но почему я, румын, должен погибать за Гитлера и венгерских помещиков, которые притесняют нас?»

Да, румыны, вам не за что погибать в России. Русские никогда не были вашими врагами. Ваши враги — немцы и венгры. Немцы отняли у румын Северную Трансильванию и отдали ее венграм. Венгры грабят и угнетают румынское население. Они убивают румынских женщин и детей. Они забирают у ваших семей хлеб, скот и продукты питания и отправляют немцам в Германию. Они забирают вашу землю и разоряют ваши хозяйства. Они обращаются с вами хуже, чем со скотом. Нет предела унижениям и оскорблениям, которым вас подвергают в венгерской армии.

Венгерский генштаб издал специальный приказ за № 3607/M1 о трансильванских румынах, в котором сказано, что характерными чертами румын являются: «лживость, вороватость, поверхностность, лень, лодыричье, лукавство, стадный инстинкт и низкий умственный уровень».

Венгры воюют кровью румын. Больше 30% трансильванских румын находится сейчас на фронте, в рядах венгерской армии. В районе Воронежа, на Дону ежедневно погибают тысячи румын.

Посмотрите в своем взводе, роте, батальоне! Сколько ваших товарищей погибло в эти дни. Смерть ждет каждого из нас на фронте.

Так пусть же в этот последний час, когда вы столкнулись лицом к лицу со смертью, каждый из вас решает, пока не поздно:


Или умереть за своих врагов, за Хорти и Гитлера.
Или спасти свою жизнь, сохранить ее для себя, для своей семьи.
Уходите от своих врагов немцев и венгров!
Переходите к своим друзьям, к русским!

ПРОПУСК
на румынском и русском языках


Прочти и передай товарищам!

T. 1781. 50. 2. 8. 42.

Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Коллекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 484 (Листівка “К трансильванским румынам венгерской армии”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 484 (Leaflet “To the Transylvanian Romanians of the Hungarian army!”)]



Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Коллекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), справа 482 (Листівка 'Как кончить войну!') [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 482 (Leaflet "How to End the War!")]



Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), справа 483 (Листівка “Письмо от жены румынскому солдату на фронт”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 483 (Leaflet “A letter from the wife of a Romanian soldier to the front)].

Главное Политическое Управление Рабоче-
 Крестьянского Военно-Морского Флота

ПАРТАРХИВ

ПРЕСС-БЮРО *9256.011*
894р. 43

30 сентября 1941 г. Бюллетень № 384 Для флотских и фло-
 тильских газет

О ЧЕМ ДУМАЮТ РУМЫНСКИЙ СОЛДАТ И МАТРОС?

Еще в октябре 1940 г. румынское правительство заключило с Гитлером тайную сделку, на основании которой Румыния была превращена в плацдарм для подготовлявшегося Гитлером вероломного нападения на Советский Союз. В Румынию были введены германские войска, которые заняли район Бухареста, нефтепромыслы в Плоешти, порт Констанца и важнейшие военно-стратегические пункты в стране. Немцы стали беспардонно хозяйничать в стране. Сырье и продовольствие без всякого стеснения спешно отправлялись в Германию. Все банки были поставлены под германский контроль. Наградой за предательство должно было явиться включение Румынии в систему новой гитлеровской Европы. Между тем, в планах «новой Европы» Румынии отведено более чем скромное место. Ей суждено служить сырьевой и продовольственной базой для гитлеровской Германии.

11 июля 1941 г. при личном свидании генерала Антонеску с Гитлером были уточнены детали активного участия Румынии в «крестовом походе» против СССР. Антонеску действовал за спиной румынского народа, воровски, тайно. Румынский народ этой войны не хотел. Каковы причины и цели этой войны — никто не знал. Об этом не знали не только широкие народные массы, но и солдаты и даже офицеры румынской армии. Военнопленный румынский солдат Курку заявил:

— «Мы абсолютно не знали целей этой войны. Я могу отдать голову на отсечение, что никто из солдат не знал и не знает, за что он идет на смерть».

Военнопленный румынский офицер капитан Заверу, командир 3 пехотного полка 11 пехотной дивизии, говорит:

— «Не только я, но и другие офицеры были настроены пессимистически, так как воевать с Россией мы не хотели».

Генерал Антонеску и его продажная клика старались внушить румынам, что война эта ведется во имя освобождения Бессарабии, что она продлится не свыше 3-х недель и закончится созданием «великой Румынии». Они старались изобразить войну против народов великого Советского Союза, как освободительную войну.

Солдат румынской армии Поньзяк рассказывает в своих показаниях:

— «Когда германские войска пришли в Румынию, нам говорили, что немцы помогут Румынии, что нам дадут в Бессарабии наделы земли и жить будет гораздо лучше».

Но вот война попрежнему продолжается. Немцы гонят румын на захват Одессы, не считаясь с огромными потерями румынской армии.

Румынские солдаты убеждаются на деле, что они являются пушечным мясом в руках немцев.

Военнопленный солдат Передеску пишет:

— «Нам обещали, что немецкие части будут идти впереди, а мы только будем следовать за ними. Но в первый же день войны мы убедились, что это была сплошная ложь. Вперед погнали нас, а немцы шли за нами, строго следя за тем, чтобы никто из нас не отставал. Отходящие части они расстреливали в упор из пулеметов».

Румынским офицерам и солдатам приходится претерпевать немало унижений от своих «союзников». Немецкие офицеры не скрывают чувства презрения к румынской армии.

Военнопленный солдат 3 пограничного полка Гиорди заметил по этому поводу:

— «Румынские солдаты должны при встречах с немецкими солдатами или офицерами приветствовать их. Немецкие солдаты и офицеры очень часто не отвечают на наши приветствия, и нередко при встрече в ответ на приветствия румын смеются, или обзывают нас мамалыжниками».

Так с каждым днем все больше вырастает не только взаимная отчужденность между «союзниками», но и острая, с трудом сдерживаемая ненависть. Взаимоотношения между румынами и немцами в результате настолько обострились, что румынскому военному министру пришлось издать специальный приказ.

— «Господин генерал Ион Антонеску заметил,— говорится в этом приказе,— что румынские офицеры не отвечают взаимно младшим командирам из германской армии на приветствия, а когда и отвечают, то делают это не по-солдатски. Приветствия между низшими чинами румынской и германской армий также не практикуются в духе дружбы».

Многие из румынских солдат и моряков жаждут мира. Именно на этой почве выросло массовое дезертирство, участились случаи самострела, падает дисциплина. Румынское командование

серьезно озабочено упадком воинской дисциплины. В приказе полковника Семиоеску за № 81 отмечается:

— «Недостаток храбрости проявляется в том, что румынские солдаты боятся пуль, боятся авиации, боятся артиллерийского огня даже тогда, когда он незначителен по своей интенсивности».

Командир 103 полка 15 пехотной дивизии доносит штабу дивизии:

— «Солдаты всячески уклоняются от боя. Группами и в одиночку они бросают оружие и сдуются в плен. За один день во второй роте устанслены 7 случаев самострела. Ни на кого нельзя возложить».

Эти пораженческие настроения среди солдат являются отражением глубокого недовольства войной и брожения в народных массах Румынии в связи с резко ухудшившимся их жизненным уровнем. Цены на хлеб и мясо за последние два месяца резко повысились. Молоко и масло стали редкостью. Безработица быстро растет. Поля остались невозделанными, ибо лошади реквизированы для армии, а оставшийся тягловый скот из-за недостатка кормов пришлось передать на убой. Нефтепромыслы и промышленные предприятия сильно пострадали от бомбардировок советской авиации. Огромные потери румынской армии вызывают среди населения чувство глубокого смятения и тревоги. Румынский солдат и моряк получают наглядный урок того, как Румыния, втянутая гитлеровскими бандитами в водоворот войны, неуклонно катится к гибели.

Половина румынской армии уничтожена в боях под Одессой. Силы этой армии надломлены, но пока еще не сокрушены окончательно. Генерал Антонеску бросает на фронт все новые дивизии. В Валахии, Трансильвании, Банате — во всех районах Румынии происходит спешная мобилизация старших возрастов. В тылу армии Антонеску сосредоточены германские части, выполняющие полицейские функции по отношению к румынским солдатам. В этих условиях румынские дивизии еще пытаются лезть вперед, не считаясь с огромными жертвами.

Героические защитники советского Черноморья должны направить свои силы и волю, чтобы нанести румынской армии ряд новых сокрушительных ударов и ускорить тем самым процесс окончательного ее разложения.

И. ЮЗЕФОВИЧ.

Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 43 (Листівка "О чем думают румынский солдат и матрос?") [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 43 (Leaflet "What are the Romanian soldiers and sailors thinking about?")].