

EXTREMES AND EXCEPTIONS: CIVILIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS IN BUKOVINA DURING WORLD WAR II

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Abstract: *The pre-war political and social atmosphere, the subsequent regulations imposed by authorities, interests or circumstances, the international context, and the moral principles motivated – together or in part – some of the decisions and actions against the Jews of Bukovina. The authors of this article raise a few questions: When and in what context did the violence occur? Where did the violence happen? Why did people do that? The organization of information in order to obtain the answers contributes to highlighting the responsibility of the actors of the time, other than the army: civilian authorities, the population of towns and villages in Bukovina. Attacks, robberies and murders are most often cited in historical analysis. They were the result of instigations and challenges, some organized at the state level, some manifesting themselves as "improvisations" of the locals. The "social field" of violence was systematically prepared in the interwar period, the ideology of right-wing radicalism and anti-Semitism entering the Romanian society, amid economic difficulties. In addition, the fear of being punished by the military authorities (who coordinated the arrest, deportation and guarding of Jews) is a basic explanation to justify avoiding mutual contact between the Jews and non-Jews. As for non-Jews civilian's solidarity, charity and support, they are less analyzed in the historiography of the problem. That is why their knowledge becomes extremely important, as long as these examples illustrating not only the forms of resistance against government actions but also the human decency and absolute, uncompromising respect for the values of humanity.*

Keywords: *Jews, Bukovina, anti-Semitism, World War II, civilian, violence, persecution, solidarity, humanity.*

Rezumat: *Extreme și Excepții: Atitudini ale populației civile față de evrei în Bucovina în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Atmosfera politică și socială de dinainte de război, regulamentele ulterioare impuse de autorități, interese și circumstanțe, contextul internațional și principiile morale, au motivat, împreună sau în parte, unele dintre deciziile și acțiunile întreprinse împotriva evreilor din Bucovina. Autorii articolului ridică o serie de întrebări: 1. Când și în ce context s-au produs actele de violență? 2. Unde s-au*

înregistrat acțiunile violente? și 3. De ce au recurs oamenii la asemenea fapte? Organizarea informației – menită să răspundă la aceste întrebări – contribuie, deopotrivă, la evidențierea responsabilității actorilor vremii, alții decât Armata: autoritățile civile, populația orașelor și satelor din Bucovina. Atacurile, jafurile și crimele sunt cel mai adesea citate în analiza istorică. Ele au fost rezultatul instigărilor și provocărilor, unele organizate la nivel de stat, altele manifestându-se ca „improvizații” ale localnicilor. „Câmpul social” al violenței a fost pregătit, în mod sistematic, încă din perioada interbelică, ideologia radicalismului de dreapta și a antisemitismului pătrunzând în societatea românească, pe fondul dificultăților economice. În plus, teama de a fi pedepsit de autoritățile militare (care au coordonat arestarea, deportarea și paza evreilor) este o explicație de bază pentru a justifica evitarea contactului reciproc între evrei și ne-evrei. În ceea ce privește solidaritatea, actele de caritate și sprijin acordate poporului evreu de către civilii ne-evrei și acestea sunt mai puțin analizate în istoriografia problemei. Iată de ce, cunoașterea lor devine extrem de importantă, aceste exemple ilustrând nu doar formele de rezistență împotriva acțiunilor guvernamentale, ci și decența umană și respectul absolut, fără compromis, pentru valorile umanității.

INTRODUCTION

Bukovina – the “Switzerland of the East”¹ – is known for its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character asserted during the 19th and 20th centuries. The tolerance of Romanians towards foreigners, regardless of their language or religion, the interest of the Moldavian squirearchy in manpower, the concerns of the Habsburg administration to increase the number of taxpayers in the incorporated territory in 1775, as well as the desire of residents of neighbouring regions and countries to move to a province with a less burdensome tax regime were the main factors that led to the agglutination of major ethnic communities. According to the 1930 census, the largest ethnic groups in Bukovina were Romanians (44,50% of the total population), Ukrainians (29,14%), Jews (10,84%), and Germans (8,85%).²

During the 19th and early 20th century, the ethnic and religious communities coexisted without violence, while the potential tension was hampered by the political compromises or the ability of the Austrian administration to resolve it. In the 1930s the situation changed radically, in the context of the establishment of totalitarian,

¹ Oskar Beck, *Bukowina: Schweiz des Ostens?*, “Der Südostdeutsche”, München, 15 Marz 1978, S. 5.

² Ștefan Purici, *Aspecte ale problemei minorităților naționale în Bucovina istorică între anii 1918 și 1940 (I)* [Aspects of the National Minorities Issue in Historical Bukovina between 1918 and 1940 (I)], in “Analele Bucovinei”, Vol. IV, 1997, No. 1, p. 143.

xenophobic regimes in Germany, Italy and most Eastern and Central European states. In Romania, the phenomenon of the proliferation of anti-democratic political currents asserted on fertile ground, maintained by far-right intellectuals and political leaders, and stimulated by the corruption and failures of the ruling class. The authoritarian regime of Carol II (in February 1938) and the military-legionary administration of Ion Antonescu and Horia Sima facilitated the legislation and the application of norms specific to dictatorships, with a pronounced ethnic character and an undisguised anti-Semitic orientation.³ The territorial losses suffered by Romania in the summer of 1940, as well as the entry into the war by Nazi Germany, created the premises for the application of xenophobic state policy with uncontrolled violence.⁴ If the governments of Carol II (February 1938 - September 1940) adopted measures against the non-Romanian population by restricting the rights of a significant mass of Romanian citizens, under the administration of Ion Antonescu – either *in association* or *alone* – Romania was attracted to the Holocaust and implementation of the policy of displacement of Roma outside the country's borders.

Over the last three decades, research on the Holocaust in Romania has become a growing and increasingly diverse field. The list of the 1990s and early 2000s publications includes a range of ground-breaking works, several source collections, the first comprehensive overviews of the topic, and the *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* assembled by an international team of scholars.⁵ These studies not only helped to clarify the basic facts but also drew attention to the issues of denial, minimization or ignorance, asking new interpretive questions: *Who was responsible for the violence and who were the perpetrators?* The answers to these questions proved to be varied: some historians saw the spread of anti-Semitism as key-driver analysis (Jean Ancel)⁶; some pointed to the leadership's aim for national renewal and sovereignty (Dennis Deletant)⁷; others mixed a bit of the two, underlining the role of

³ Ioan Scurtu, *Regimul de autoritate monarhică (februarie 1938 – septembrie 1940)* [The Regime of Monarchical Authority (February 1938 – September 1940)], in Ioan Scurtu, Petre Otu (Eds.), *Istoria românilor* [The History of Romanians], Vol. VIII, *România întregită (1918-1940)* [Reunited Romania], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 391-421.

⁴ In the summer of 1940 and the following months, the first large-scale violent anti-Semitic actions were recorded. See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime 1940-1944*. With a Foreword by Elie Wiesel and a Preface by Paul A. Shapiro, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 2000, p. 39-79.

⁵ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report*, International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2004, 415 p.

⁶ Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania*, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press; Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, 2011, 699 p.

⁷ Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and his regime, Romania 1940-44*,

mid-level officials and showing how xenophobia and plans for national purification could lead to ethnic cleansing (Vladimir Solonari)⁸, while others demonstrated how an entire society could become mobilised for the sake of genocide (Armin Heinen).⁹ During the war, one of the most relevant features of the measures adopted against the Jews was related to their geographical dispersion. Unable to recover Northern Transylvania, the attention of the Romanian authorities focused on the Jews of Bukovina and Bessarabia.¹⁰ According to estimates, in 1941, 91,845 Bukovinian Jews were deported to Transnistria. To this figure must be added 4,290 Jews From Bukovina deported in 1942.¹¹

However, the Holocaust in Romania has known different phases, intensities, and degrees of involvement of people in violent actions. From a historiographical perspective, one of the first historical approaches of Bukovina belongs to Matatias Carp¹², who presents the scale of the atrocities committed against the Jews. Along the same line are the works and studies signed by Radu Ioanid¹³, while the analyses and volumes of documents published by Lya Benjamin offer a perspective on the evolution of anti-Semitic legislation in Romania¹⁴. Florence Heymann makes a radiograph of the Jewish community during the war through the case studies¹⁵, and Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer offer a different viewpoint

Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 379 p.

⁸ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii. Dislocări forțate de populație și epurări etnice în România lui Ion Antonescu: 1940-1944* [Purifying the Nation: Forced Population Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing in Romania of Ion Antonescu: 1940-1944], București, Editura Polirom, 2015, 424 p.

⁹ Armin Heinen, *Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt*, München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007, 208 p.

¹⁰ Gaëlle Fisher, *Between Liberation and Emigration: Jews from Bukovina in Romania after the Second World War*, in "Leo Baeck Institute Year Book", Vol. 62, 2017, p. 118-119.

¹¹ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 177.

¹² Matatias Carp, *Cartea neagră. Fapte și documente. Suferințele evreilor din România, 1940-1944* [Black Book: Facts and Documents. The Sufferings of the Jews of Romania, 1940-1944], București, Libraria Socec Co., Vol. I, 1946; Vol. II, 1948; Vol III, 1947.

¹³ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*

¹⁴ Lya Benjamin, Sergiu Stanciu (Eds.), *Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944: Izvoare și marturisiri referitoare la evreii din România* [The Jews of Romania during 1940-1944: Sources and confessions regarding the Jews in Romania], Vol. I, București, Editura Hasefer, 1993; Lya Benjamin (Ed.), *Problema evreiască în stenogramele Consiliului de Miniștri* [The Jewish Problem in the Records of the Council of Ministers], Vol. II, București, Editura Hasefer, 1996, 623 p.

¹⁵ Florence Heymann, *Le Crépuscule des lieux : Identités juives de Czernowitz*, Paris, Stock, 2003, 442 p.

than the historical one¹⁶, exploring concepts such as *memory* and *post-memory*.¹⁷ According to Jan Gross's model of escalating inter-ethnic animosities, Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson summarize the attitude of the majority towards the Jewish minority in Northern Bukovina¹⁸. The recent research focuses more on Cernăuți (Liviu Cărare)¹⁹, on deportation (Vladimir Solonari)²⁰ or on rescuers such as Traian Popovici (Mariana Hausleitner)²¹. In other words, the documentation on the Jewish community in Bukovina in World War II is diverse, taking the form of specialized studies, journals, interviews, and testimonies of survivors published in collections of documents or virtual archives such as www.inshr-ew.ro or www.survivors-romania.org.

ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES IN APPROACHING THE JEWS-GENTILE CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS (1940-1944)

Starting from an interesting analysis of research on the Holocaust in Romania, published by Gaëlle Fisher in 2018²², the relations between Jews and

¹⁶ Liviu Carare, *Jews of Cernăuți. 1941-1944*, Doctoral thesis summary http://www.history-cluj.ro/Istorie/Ro/Doctorate/doctorat_carare/Rezumat.L.Carare.ENG.pdf (Accessed on 14.05.2019)

¹⁷ Marianne Hirsch, Leo Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home: The Afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish Memory*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009, 362 p.

¹⁸ Diana Dumitru, Carter Johnson, *Constructing Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation. Why Some People Harmed Jews and Others Helped Them during the Holocaust in Romania*, in "World Politics", Vol. 63, 2011, No. 1, p. 1–42.

¹⁹ Liviu Carare, *Considerații privind ghețoizarea evreilor din Cernăuți (1941)* [Considerations on the Chernivtsi Jews process of ghettoization (1941)], in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu, Series Historica, 2010, Vol. XLIX, p. 99-107; Idem, *Deportările din Cernăuți (1941). Mărturii pe baza unui raport de anchetă informativă* [Deportations from Chernivtsi (1941). Testimonies based on an informative investigation report], in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (Eds.), *Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX* [Political parties and national minorities in Romania in the twentieth century], Vol. V, Sibiu, Editura Techno Media, 2010, p. 247-255.

²⁰ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*

²¹ Mariana Hausleitner, *Acțiunile de salvare a evreilor prizoniți, în special în Bucovina, 1941-1944* [The rescue actions for persecuted Jews, especially in Bukovina, 1941-1944], in Wolfgang Benz, Brigitte Mihok (Eds.), *Holocaustul la periferie. Persecutarea și nimicirea evreilor în România și Transnistria în 1940-1944* [Holocaust at the Periphery: Persecution and destruction of the Jews in Romania and Transnistria in 1940-1944], Chișinău, Editura Cartier, 2010, p. 173-198.

²² Gaëlle Fisher, *New Research on the Holocaust in Romania*, in "Sehepunkte", 2018, No. 3,

civilians between 1940-1944, can be examined in the light of some analytical categories and specific questions.: 1. Time: *When and in what context did the violence occur?* 2. Space: *Where did the violence happen?* 3. Reasons: *Why did people do that?* The organisation of data under the first three questions serves to underscore the foremost issue of responsibility of the actors (civilians, authorities, human beings).

1. Time

According to Diana Dumitru, the rampant anti-Semitism had to do with long-term socio-cultural trends rather than the immediate historical circumstances. She stressed that the civilians in Bukovina acted, as the population of Bessarabia, in a context shaped by the state and in special political conditions.²³ From a social standpoint, the escalation of the anti-Semitic climate in Romania characterized the period between the two World Wars. The Iron Guard, the League of Christian National Defence, the ideology, writings and rhetoric of politicians, writers, scholars and reporters paved the road for the penetration and application of fascist ideology. In January 1938, the Government Goga-Cuza promulgated the *Law of citizenship revision* – the first manifestation of racial persecution against the Jews. King Carol II continued to promote an anti-Semitic agenda of varying degrees.²⁴

1.1. Phase A. (June 1940 – May/June 1941)

At the end of June 1941, the Soviet Union annexed Northern Bukovina by the demand of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its additional secret protocol. Marcu Rozen considers that the renunciation, without opposition, of a part of the national territory of Romania, required a scapegoat to be blamed for this loss.²⁵ The Soviets did not respect the conditions of the ultimatum entering earlier in the Romanian territories and triggering terrible persecution against the civilian population. The NKVD agents arrested and investigated a large number of soldiers and civilians, forcing them by terror to sign statements and provide information regarding the location of the Romanian Armed Forces. Some Romanians were detained based on so-called “denunciations made by Jews”, while others were

<http://www.sehepunkte.de/2018/03/30622.html> (Accessed on 18.04.2019)

²³ Diana Dumitru, *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 5

²⁴ Marcu Rozen, *The Holocaust under the Antonescu Government. Historical and Statistical Data about Jews in Romania, 1940 – 1944*, IVth Edition, revised and completed, Bucharest, 2006, p. 9, http://www.survivors-romania.org/pdf_doc/the_holocaust_under_the_antonescu_government.pdf (Accessed on 18.04.2019)

²⁵ *Ibid.*

assaulted by “Judeo-communist bands,” although the *enemies’* names and facts could not be specified in exact terms.²⁶ The “Judeo-Communist” cliché has spread rapidly, while immediately after June 28, 1940, the Jewish communities of the Romanian Kingdom publicly dissociated themselves from the individual behaviour of those who manifested hostility towards the retreating Romanian soldiers. In Southern Bukovina, the anti-Semitic actions intensified in January 1941 and violence, robberies, and crimes occurred in both urban and rural communities during the legionary rebellion. Furthermore, the measures against the Jews expanded and radicalized after the establishment of the Antonescu regime. In the Northern part of Bukovina occupied by the Soviets, drastic actions against the locals also hit hard in the Jewish community (merchants, entrepreneurs, officials, former notabilities, political leaders, etc.). The helping behaviour and the feelings of compassion towards the victims of the communist system became impossible due to the terror regime.

1.2. Phase B. (June 1941 – 1942)

The summer of 1941 coincided with the entrance of the Romanian-German troops into Northern Bukovina, when other extreme local violence broke out, along with the introduction of new discriminatory ordinances aimed at regulating the status and activity of the Jews all over the province. During this phase – which is the most convincing, in terms of documentation, within the context of existing literature – the local people used violence before and in the first days of the reinstatement of the Romanian administration. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the power vacuum, ethnic Romanians and especially Ukrainian paramilitary groups resorted to violence and carried out executions among the Jewish population.²⁷ The process of ghettoisation, sortation, and deportation to Transnistria as well as the tragic episodes of 1942 illustrate how the Romanian government implemented the racial policy in Bukovina. The collective culpability of Jews and their transformation into “internal and external enemies” led not only to the stigmatisation of the Jewish population but also to the invention of new ways of monitoring and eliminating “the danger”.²⁸ This stage is one of the most tragic, with only a few of the Bukovina Jews managing to avoid

²⁶ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Dilemele conviețuirii: evreii în Bucovina (1774-1947)* [The Dilemmas of Coexistence: Jews in Bukovina], Iași, Editura Pim, 2013, p. 420.

²⁷ For more details, see Vladimir Solonari, *The Treatment of the Jews of Bukovina by the Soviet and Romanian Administrations in 1940–1944*, in “Holocaust and Modernity. Studies in Ukraine and the World”, 2010, No. 2, p. 163-165.

²⁸ See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 69-70.

deportation, benefiting from the state's decision to keep the indispensable specialists.

1.3. Phase C. (1943 – 1944)

In the second half of 1942, the official attitude towards the Jews has become more ambiguous and more oscillating, reverting to the “traditional” forms of persecution. Unlike the Nazi-controlled areas (where the massacres were systematic and the racist-ideological motivation of the executors ensured a disciplined and relentless application of the Final Solution), in Bukovina, the slow pace of “purification” became questionable. The maltreatment or exploitation of Jews, the rescue initiatives at the discretion of a local leader or commander, and the confusion caused by contradictions in orders left room for greater freedom of action for employers who did not use the Jews “for their own sake,” but “in the interest of the national economy”.²⁹ Moreover, in March/April 1943, the installation of the new Governor of Bukovina, General Dragalina, coincided with a period of relative relaxation of the pressure on the Jews. In the areas controlled by the Romanian authorities, the number of survivors was higher compared to the Jewish population in the territories under German administration. According to a report addressed to the Romanian Government, in November 1943, at least 34,141 deported Bukovinian Jews were in Transnistria³⁰, even though in the summer of that year, officials agreed to return a small number of them. The reintegration of former deportees into the community has been problematic³¹, the acts of hostility intertwining with solidarity and humanity.³²

2. Space

The dismantling of Bukovina in 1940 and the annexation of its Northern part by the Soviet Union gave the events a different rhythm and characteristics.

²⁹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 204.

³⁰ Ottmar Trașcă, „Chestiunea evreiască” în *documente militare române. 1941-1944* [The “Jewish Question” in Romanian Military Documents. 1941-1944], Iași, Editura Institutul European, 2010, p. 819.

³¹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 208. Similar attitudes had been recorded since the autumn of 1941 when some residents of Siret demanded in a memorandum – having a typed table with the names of applicants, but without handwritten signatures – that the evacuated Jews “should not be brought back in the locality”. Interestingly, the resolution on this request was the following: “Jews should remain in the town, while the denouncers will be dismissing” in Suceava County Directorate of National Archives (*hereinafter* – DJANS), Fund *Prefectura județului Rădăuți* [The Prefecture of Rădăuți County], F. 145/1941, f. 127-128, 141, 147.

³² <https://www.inshr-ew.ro> (Accessed on 22.02.2020)

2.1. Provincial delimitation: North-South

Most historians justifiably choose to simultaneously analyse the dramatic realities of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, due to the similarities created by the new politico-military framework. However, in the Northern part of the province, the situation became complicated as a result of the violence and atrocities committed by the Ukrainian nationalists and later by Einsatzgruppe Ek 10b. From this perspective, the multitude of sources contributes to a more accurate historical reconstruction, including the relationship between Jews and non-Jews civilians.

2.2. Living area delimitations: cities - small towns and villages

Vladimir Solonari believes that living in separate neighbourhoods of the cities the Jews were easy to be recognised.³³ Therefore, the support of residents was not a crucial requirement for the success of anti-Jewish operations. On the contrary, the participation of local Christians in the villages was necessary, especially to the soldiers and gendarmes. Simon Geissbühler thinks that the Jews could be clearly and immediately distinguished due to their clothing and appearance.³⁴ Yet, in some localities, many Jews were largely assimilated into the community, and only their neighbours could identify them. In small towns or villages, the local perpetrators committed massacres intending to obtain the goods/properties of the Jews or to “expel them ritually”, since the Jews represented the epitome of the “Other”.³⁵ The survivors of pogroms sought refuge in larger towns such as Cernăuți. Even so, the local collaborators – ready to identify the Jewish homes or shops – betrayed the Jews’ hiding places and delivered them to the perpetrators.³⁶ Here is why the exceptions are all the more important as it illustrates the humanity in extreme conditions. One of the examples is given by Shalom Eitan, whose family was rescued during the massacre by a non-Jewish civilian.³⁷

3. Reasons

The comments on the *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* highlight the outcome of the Antonescu regime’s antisemitic propaganda, which succeeded in “a kind of neutralization of public reaction” or “de-sensitization of the majority of

³³ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 184.

³⁴ Simon Geissbühler, “He spoke Yiddish like a Jew”: Neighbors’ Contribution to the Mass Killing of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, July 1941, “Holocaust and Genocide Studies”, Vol. 28, 2014, No. 3, p. 437.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

³⁷ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești, pentru ca să povestești!* [To survive to tell the story], Boian, 2005, p. 22-24, <http://www.mareleboian.com/wp-content/uploads/Shalom-Eitan-Sa-supravetuiesti-ca-sa-povestesti.pdf> (Accessed on 07.03.2019)

the population towards whatever was happening to the Jews". The compassionate or indignant reactions went hand in hand with the passive acceptance of the crime or even participate in the anti-Semitic mechanism.³⁸

3.1. *Motivation of persecution, violence, and crime*

There are limits to reconstituting the causes that led to the violence. What can be said with certainty is that: a) the reasons were multiple and b) it is impossible to find a general explanation or a single cause for what happened. However, some general patterns of mentalities have undoubtedly influenced the decisions and actions of the civilians.

3.1.1. *Economic motives*

In September 1941, in an informative note sent to the gendarmes the dissatisfaction of the Romanians was mentioned because "all the services in the locality, starting from restaurants, sausages, debts, and other enterprises, all the service personnel are only Jews ... and the Romanians walk the streets, unable to do any kind of service". According to the authorities' reply, the finding was real, but also that "Romanians, although they crave different positions, do not have the qualifications and the training they need to take care of."³⁹ Such a portrait of the economic life of Bukovina reflects the reality of a province where the Jews controlled most of the business, enterprises and trade. During the war, many civilians saw nothing reprehensible in taking the land, houses, or personal items of the murdered or deported Jews.⁴⁰ Corruption and bribery could facilitate easy and rapid enrichment. In many cases, the negative characters were extremely poor or less educated civilians, apparently despised in their community. However, there were some exceptions, such as those noted by the mayor of Cernăuți, Traian Popovici. In his memoirs, he refers to the stage after the creation of the ghetto, when the "broker intellectuals, known to the Cernăuți populations as "decent people from all walks of life and social professions", behaved "like hyenas that sniffed the soul corpses of these miserable".⁴¹ The survivor Scherzer recorded in his memoirs: "In the following days, feeling that the time was right to take

³⁸ *Solidarity and Rescue in Romania*, From the *Report of the Elie Wiesel Commission*, <https://www.yadvashem.org/righteous/resources/solidarity-and-rescue-in-romania.html> (Accessed on 10.05.2019)

³⁹ Liviu Cărare, *Considerații privind procesul de ghettoizare a evreilor din Cernăuți* [Considerations on the Czernowitz Jews process of ghettoization], „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «G. Barițiu» din Cluj-Napoca”, Vol. XLIX, 2010, p. 103.

⁴⁰ Simon Geissbühler, "He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"..., p. 438.

⁴¹ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania. Biografie. Mărturii* [The Confession. Biography. Testimonies], edited by Dragoș Olaru, Serghei Voronțov, Cernăuți, Editura Rodovid, 2018, p. 110.

advantage of those in despair, Romanian civilians descended in droves into the ghetto. They came like vultures ready for a feast (...) They helped themselves to people's possessions, stole whatever they liked, grabbed whatever they could. They walked away with the goods, knowing well that the Jews were too intimidated to complain. After all, to whom could we complain?... Stealing from Jews had become legal. I discovered that in the absence of law or fear of punishment, even well mannered, well dressed middle-class people could turn into rapacious predators. They discard the laws of civilized behaviour and replace them with wanton, unscrupulous greed. They steal, they rob and trampled the dignity of defenceless people, who until yesterday had been their neighbours".⁴² Other greedy Gentiles "bought" or stole numerous assets from Jewish homes during or after the owners' relocation to the ghetto. According to Popovici, "if deportation itself was a monstrosity, then the exploitation of despondency overcame all. It was the vilest degradation of human morals. That greed could lower human beings so deeply into the mire seemed unbelievable".⁴³ The avarice and the opportunism become keywords, explaining the desire of some persons to obtain favours from the Romanian authorities after the summer of 1941.

3.1.2. Ideological/political motives

The outbreaks of anti-Semitic propaganda through nearly the entire interwar period and the nationalist and anti-Semitic indoctrination delegitimizing and dehumanizing the Jews clearly added to the "long-term cultural and psychological preparation" of violence against the Jews. Jean Ancel considers that the mass murder of the Jews in Northern Bukovina was nothing more than "the last stage of a long process of anti-Semitic policy development".⁴⁴ This anti-Semitism was only intensified by the convincing theme of "Jews' aim to control the political apparatus of the state", then by the myth of "Jewish treachery" following the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR, in the summer of 1940, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.⁴⁵ No matter how powerful the German military and SS apparatus was, it could not have made such carnage on its own. The killing of Jews in Europe took place with the support of local collaborators (military, civilians, officials, etc.) among ethnic Germans, Baltic nations, Ukrainians, Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, French, and many others.⁴⁶ However,

⁴² Ștefan Cristian Ionescu, "Californian" Colonists versus Local Profiteers?, in "Yad Vashem Studies", Jerusalem, Vol. 44, 2016, No. 2, p. 129.

⁴³ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 111.

⁴⁴ Jean Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 216.

⁴⁵ Simon Geissbühler, "He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"..., p. 439.

⁴⁶ Doris L. Bergen, *Rivalry, Indifference or Solidarity? Jews and 'Other Victims' in Studies of*

the violence against Jews, in June-July 1940, was carried out by the Romanian military, who saw in the Mosaic community a literal supporter of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁷ In Bukovina, most of the population was not involved in pogroms or other anti-Semitic actions. The collective culpability of the Jews led to the rapid degradation of their situation culminating in ghettos, deportations and other nightmare events. The return of the Romanian administration determined some of the Bukovinians left in the Soviet-occupied territory to prove their loyalty by reprehensible deeds against the Jews.⁴⁸ The forces that drove the civilian extremists and perpetrators included anti-Semitism, anti-Communism (or rather anti-Russianism), brutality, and sadism.

3.2. Motivation of solidarity

Psychologists Samuel and Pearl Olinery distinguish three groups of social psychological solidarity: a) people with a developed sense of empathy; b) people who proved a superior sense of duty to the “reference group”; c) people who are primarily guided by moral principles, helping anyone who asks for it.⁴⁹

According to Mariana Hausleitner, there is still little evidence on the solidarity actions of non-Jewish civilians in Bukovina concerning the persecuted Jewish population. On the one hand, it can be explained by the small number of rescuers; on the other hand, it is a neglected issue, all over Romania, not just in Bukovina.⁵⁰ The authors of the afore-mentioned *Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania* believe that most acts of support were not recorded in documents, although they remained alive in the minds and hearts of those Jews who were in extreme situations, surviving only due to the “intervention of such Romanians”.⁵¹ Besides, during the war, the odds of meeting a rescuer largely depended on the very different circumstances in which Jewish communities found themselves. The case of Boian pogrom proves that individual initiatives were often successful. Yet, many people who may have otherwise been willing to help were unable to

the Holocaust and Comparative Genocide, in John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell, Margot Levy, Wendy Whitworth (Eds.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide*, Vol. 1, *History*, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 31.

⁴⁷ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 39-40.

⁴⁸ Vladimir Solonari, *Patterns of Violence. The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941*, in “Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History”, Vol. 8, 2007, No. 4, p. 749-787.

⁴⁹ Samuel P. Oliner, Pearl M. Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe*, New York, The Free Press, 1988.

⁵⁰ Mariana Hausleitner, *Acțiunile de salvare...*, p. 173.

⁵¹ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 290.

overcome the paralysis stemming from their feelings towards the Jews. Since the anti-Semitic propaganda was so intense during the war, the compassion for Jewish suffering, humiliation, and persecution was construed as socially inappropriate or perceived as evidence of a lack of patriotism and even treason.⁵² The persons who helped the Jews had different ages, various degrees of education and came from the most diverse social categories.

In most cases, the primary motivation of rescuers is the personal relationship with their neighbours, friends or colleagues at work.⁵³ Ideological reasons (belonging to an anti-fascist or religious group) are rare and questionable. In the absence of a personal relationship with the Jews, they are spontaneous human gestures justified by attachment to the values of a code of solidarity (invoking, exceptionally, *love* as total concern for others, or *justice* as interest for others and oneself). For example, on 14 July 1942, Dori Popovici, a political leader of Bukovina and former minister in the Romanian government in the 1920s, in a letter to Mihai Antonescu, vice-president of the Council of Ministers, harshly criticized the deportations of Jews from Bukovina to Transnistria: "These methods are alien to a civilized country, alien to the spirituality of the Romanian population in this region, a population educated for fifty years to respect the law and public morals. These methods were applied without any reason or motivation, and this population was condemned to watch convoys of hundreds and thousands of Jews, many of them lifetime acquaintances or neighbours, being escorted by armed guards in the streets of Cernăuți with only what they could carry on those Sunday mornings when church bells announce the beginning of the mass. This Romanian population had to watch the heart-breaking scene of thousands of Jews crying and yelling with desperation during this pitiful march in the streets of the city".⁵⁴

ARCHETYPES OF THE CIVILIAN

Taking into account the three indicators (time, space, and motivation) and the information extracted from the historical analysis or testimonies of the sur-

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁵³ See the motivations and characteristics of the rescuer, in Mary J. Gallant, *Social Dimensions of Rescue in the Holocaust*, in John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell, Margot Levy, Wendy Whitworth (Eds.), *Remembering for the Future. The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide*, Vol. 2, *Ethics and Religion*, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p. 257.

⁵⁴ Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu (Eds.), *Final Report...*, p. 298-299.

vivors, some of the behavioural archetypes can be identified among the civilian population of Bukovina. They represent typical motivations, goals and general attitudes of the civilians, showing also how these can change based on their life and war experiences.

A. The "Neighbour"

The archetype does not strictly refer to the word "neighbour" but covers a wide variety of terms (acquaintances, colleagues, friends or community members). It is the most easily identifiable, appearing in a double hypostasis: opponent or rescuer/sympathetic. In Geissbühler's study on Northern Bukovina in July 1941, the neighbours – predominantly rural residents – are not just apathetic, indifferent, and passive, but most violent, materializing their extreme actions in crimes. They beat and stole from the Jews, handed them over to the soldiers, helped search for fugitives and plundered Jewish homes.⁵⁵ Sometimes they organized pogroms, the one in Bănila/Siret being described by Radu Ioanid as "[one] of the most horrible massacres" to take place in Northern Bukovina that July. The slaughter was so brutal that the local priest refused to enter the church for the Sunday liturgy the day after the massacre: "I'm ashamed to step inside the church, while my co-believers lend themselves to crimes. I'm ashamed".⁵⁶ From the perspective of criminals, their actions were spontaneous proof of "vigilance" or "patriotism." From the victims' point of view, the attack by the local population was a surprising and shocking act. The disappearance of the neighbourhood, of a relationship that was sometimes tense or harmonious, structured around mutual (economic) dependence, created perplexity. The myth of tolerance and understanding between national minorities, specific to the human geography of Bukovina had shattered in 1940. Ietti Leibovici, who lived in Vatra Dornei, remembered that "in Bukovina, there were many customs adopted from the Germans and they always came to our holidays. The friends of my mother and the friends of my aunt visited us. We visited them. We got along and, suddenly, the anti-Semitism broke out".⁵⁷ The more incomprehensible was the extreme manifestation of anti-Semitism; the perpetrators were not uniformed security forces with whom the sufferers had no relationship: they were the neighbours of the victims. The Jewish community of Boian refused to take seriously the warning of Eitan, a newcomer: "One of my father's workers, out of gratitude to

⁵⁵ Simon Geissbühler, *"He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"...*, p. 433.

⁵⁶ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 98.

⁵⁷ *Interviu Ietti Leibovici* [Interview Ietti Leibovici], Institutul Național pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/222-interviu-ietti-leibovici.html> (Accessed on 05.09.2019)

my father, because he taught him the job of milling, or because he was a good man, advised him to leave immediately, for the night that comes something terrible will happen. My father told this to the local Jews, but they received his words without care and irony. They said that nothing bad can happen to the Jews, because they lived here for hundreds of years, and their relationships with the villagers are warm and friendly. My father listened to the mill's advice but did not take his words seriously. Yet, we climbed into the attic and made a barricade at the door (...). *Goim*, who have lived alongside the Jews for generations, with their hands destroyed the Jewish population of the village. It was not a single killer or an organised pogrom, but voluntary destruction of the villagers' neighbours".⁵⁸ In this passage are found both the hypostases of the "neighbour": the killer and the rescuer. The perplexity also appears in the testimonies of Doctor Landau, who remembered when his former patients treated by him without any payment, entered his house and robbed his family.⁵⁹ In turn, Miriam Korber wrote: "... the neighbours looked at us like we were some monsters; they did not refrain from spit: Look, the kike! Well done, well done! The war is because of them".⁶⁰ Romanian and Ukrainian civilians were the perpetrators of the crimes committed in Bănila/ Ceremuş (170 victims), Stăneştii de Jos (between 80 and 88 victims), Stăneştii de Sus (more than 40 victims).⁶¹ Still another slaughter took place in Milie, where Ukrainians killed nearly the entire Jewish population, somewhere between 110 and 180 people.⁶²

Analysis of the solidarity of Gentiles with the persecuted Jews in Bukovina is still incomplete. Most of the documentary sources illustrate the period 1943-1945 when several families of the survivors of the Transnistrian camps were helped by the locals to rebuild their households.⁶³ In her testimony, Erika Weinstein-Feiler recalls the distribution of family belongings to her father's colleagues or non-Jewish neighbours: "If we returned, we would have recovered something. Otherwise, it would have been a gift from our family". After returning from Transnistria in 1944,

⁵⁸ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești...*, p. 22-23.

⁵⁹ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 186.

⁶⁰ *Interviu Miriam Korber-Bercovici* [Interview Miriam Korber-Bercovici], Institutul Național pentru Studiarea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/162-interviu-miriam-korber-bercovici.html> (Accessed on 29.03.2020)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁶³ *Interviu Solomon Rauth* [Interview Solomon Rauth], Institutul Național pentru Studiarea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel", <http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/marturii/220-interviu-solomon-rauth.html> (Accessed on 14.03.2020)

Erika remembered: “We received a large part of the goods that we entrusted to doctors and neighbours before our deportation”.⁶⁴ There are cases of exceptional initiatives such as that of a group of “local Christians” in Vârtecăuți (Northern Bukovina), who found out about the arrest of the 12 Jewish families in their village. They “gathered and waited for the future assassins in the middle of the road, begging on their knees to release the victims. Thus, the Jews were released”.⁶⁵ Much more familiar is the case of the church painter George Russu – one of the “rights among nations” – who rescued the family of David Șlacman, a printing artist with whom he collaborated in the printing house of the Metropolitan Church in Cernăuți.⁶⁶ Another “right among nations” is Simion Hîj, a lawyer from Cernăuți. Although he was no longer a prefect of the Storojineț district, using his relations, he managed to obtain the liberation of several Jews from the Vașcăuți ghetto, subsequently saving others from deportation to Transnistria. According to the testimonies of many witnesses, his home in Cernăuți has become a refuge for many Jews, while others received material and financial aid.⁶⁷ Șerban Flondor (son of Iancu Flondor), engineer, large owner, genealogy and heraldry specialist⁶⁸, supplied with food the Jews in the Storojineț camp. Relying on the help of the leaders of the Romanian Railways, he helped several Jews to reach București, locking them in sleeping compartments. Taking advantage of the benefits he enjoyed as a councillor for the Chamber of Agriculture, he used his train car to send Jews from Bukovina to București, where they could be hidden more easily.⁶⁹

B. The Civil Authority/ The Clerk

Some authors have suggested that “local perpetrators and their collabora-

⁶⁴ Erika Feiler, *geb. Weinstein, in Verlorene Kindheit. Copilărie pierdută*, Projektgruppe “Kriegsgräber”, 2017, pp. 83-87, http://www.rsg-roev.de/europaschule/dateien/pdf/kg_verloreneKindheit2017.pdf (Accessed on 15.05.2019)

⁶⁵ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 185.

⁶⁶ Csaba István Székely, *The Holocaust of Memories*, Miercurea Ciuc, Editura Alutus, 2011, p. 41-50; <https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/pdf-drupal/romania.pdf> (Accessed on 12.09.2019)

⁶⁷ Dumitru Valenciu, *Încă un uitat: dr. Simion Hîj* [Another Forgotten: Dr. Simion Hîj], „Crai Nou”, 10 august 2017, <https://www.crainou.ro/2017/08/10/inca-un-uitat-dr-simion-hij/> (Accessed on 06.04.2019)

⁶⁸ Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, *Un nobil bucovinean la București și resuscitarea studiilor genealogice românești* [A Bukovinian Nobleman in Bucharest and the Resuscitation of Romanian Genealogical Studies], în „Muzeul Național de Istorie a României”, Vol. XVII, 2005, No. 1, p. 157-173.

⁶⁹ Marius Mircu, *Oameni de omenie în vremuri de neomenie* [Humane People in Inhumane Times], București, Editura Hasefer, 1996, p. 87.

tors were usually individuals on the margins of society who were acting out their frustrations".⁷⁰ This inclination to attribute collaboration to marginal groups, however, falls far short of adequacy. In Bănila/Siret, for example, the town mayor organized the pogrom. A lawyer was responsible for drawing up the list of Jews to be killed in Coțmani.⁷¹ In Suceava, after the departure of all convoys, the mayor of the city summoned the population to a general meeting where he praised the decision to deport the Jews, praised Germany and Marshal Antonescu "and thanked God that Suceava got rid of the Jews".⁷² Due to the intensity of the anti-Semitic propaganda during the war, the measures taken for the aggression, massacre or deportation of the Jews were perceived, by a part of the provincial administration, as a component of a necessary national rescue policy. According to the confession of Traian Popovici, "some leaders of the authorities in all the public compartments, "following the principle *exempla trahunt*", "competed with the government", so that "the whole range of oppression happened sadistically, from top to bottom, not to the degradation of the nation, but of humanity: the removal of Jews from hospitals and sanatoriums".⁷³ Greed made some public servants promise Jews that they would be freed from the ghettos in exchange for money, while others "were eager to sell their goods at heavily inflated prices while devaluing their homes".⁷⁴ Civil servants, hoping to receive the homes of future deportees, protested against the suspension of deportations in November 1941. However, some Bukovinians tried to ignore the inhumane measures adopted by the Romanian military authorities. Thus, the Romanian Petru Bruja, appointed mayor of Storojineț on July 1941, tried to free four thousand Jews whose lives had been spared, who were locked in two school buildings, where they were left for three days without food or clean water. Because Colonel Alexandrescu, who commanded the recruitment district, and the powerful landowner Șerban Flondor opposed him, Petru Bruja resigned. Instead, the new mayor - Dimitrie Rusu - and the deputy mayor Ștefan Tomovici organized the ghetto and forced Jews to clean the city streets daily.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Simon Geissbühler, "He spoke Yiddish like a Jew"..., p. 440.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Mărturia președintelui Comunității din Suceava, Meir Teich (din anul 1946) cu privire la pregătirile și executarea deportării* [Testimony of the President of the Community of Suceava, Meir Teich (since 1946) regarding the preparations and execution of the deportation], in Matatias Carp, *Cartea neagră...*, Vol. III, p. 149.

⁷³ Traian Popovici, *Sposedania...*, p. 100.

⁷⁴ Vladimir Solonari, *Purificarea națiunii...*, p. 198.

⁷⁵ Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania...*, p. 73.

Unlike them, or those who showed solidarity with the Jewish cause for mercantile reasons (profiteers), Traian Popovici, the mayor of Chernivtsi, is by far an exceptional case⁷⁶. He strongly opposed the ghettoization and deportation of the Jews, against Antonescu's military orders, directly contributing to the salvation of thousands of Jews from deportation and death (17,000⁷⁷ or nearly 20,000⁷⁸). As stated by testimonies, the rescue of the 20,000 Jews from Chernivtsi was the merit of Corneliu Calotescu, Governor-General of Bukovina (02.09.1941 - 20.03.1943), or Fritz Schellhorn, German Consul in Chernivtsi (1934-1944).⁷⁹ In any case, if he had not made an effort to find support, understanding or at least tolerance from other decision-makers, Traian Popovici's approach would have failed. In his *Confession*, the mayor of Chernivtsi declares: "I do not claim the honour of being human. I claim it for the entire office of the mayor, which shared my feelings and, under my leadership, did not surrender to any act of inferiority and proved to have a soul".⁸⁰ He also says that there were other "interventions" of the "leaders in the counties", but that they were "badly credited".⁸¹ Less known is the name of Egon Patac Balmoș, the lawyer who tried to protect the Jews in Rădăuți, requesting the release of the sick.⁸² Constantin Hrehorciuc, chief of the gendarme station in Stăneștii de Jos, mediated for the Jews held hostage in several Bukovinian localities by armed groups of Ukrainians who had set out to execute between ten and fifteen of them every day. He later ignored the order to send Jews to the camps of Storojineț and Văscăuți.⁸³ Then so did the former director of Rădăuți herd, Ion Larionescu, clerk Margulis from the Rădăuți spirits factory, German lawyer Albert Twers of Rădăuți, who all mediated the correspondence between the Transnistrian deportees and the Jews remaining in Rădăuți or

⁷⁶ See Marianne Hirsch, Leo Spitzer, *The Cernăuți Ghetto, the Deportations, and the Decent Mayor*, in Valentina Glajar, Jeanine Teodorescu (Eds.), *Local history, transnational memory in the Romanian Holocaust*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 57-76.

⁷⁷ Gaëlle Fisher, *Between Liberation and Emigration...*, p. 119.

⁷⁸ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 124.

⁷⁹ Hartwig Cremers, *Czernowitz 1941/1942 – der Einsatz des deutschen Konsuls Fritz Schellhorn für die Juden*, in "Sudost-Forschungen", Band 73, 2014, S. 450-457; Vladimir Solonari, *The Treatment of the Jews...*, p. 170-172.

⁸⁰ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 101.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁸² DJANS, Fund *Prefectura județului Rădăuți* [The Prefecture of Rădăuți County], F. 145/1941, f. 85.

⁸³ Marius Mircu, *Oameni de omenie...*, p. 82-83.

Chernivtsi.⁸⁴ In all cases, it was a conscious, deliberate and well-grounded assumption of the moral duty of the person involved, willingly or unwillingly, in a limiting situation. Acting or remaining passive ultimately depended on the decision to accept or reject participation in committing an abominable crime, even then, or especially when the crime was “legal”.

C. The “Unknown”/ The “Other”

This archetype introduces “the elastic view” of the attitude level of civilians in Bukovina: some people were strongly anti-Semitic, others less so, and others may not fit into either of the categories. “The Unknown” or “The Others” are not part of the “neighbours” or “clerks” categories, although they may share ideals and motivations. They are rather the type of neutral, hostile or compassionate kind towards Jews who have reached the limit. Literature related to Bukovina, whether historical studies or memoirs, presents the “others” as passively accepting the murder, by implicitly participating in the functioning of the anti-Semitic mechanism. In his memoirs, Shalom Eitan remembers the episode of his family’s escape from Boian, after the massacre he witnessed. The attempt to “lease” a horse and a wagon and the meeting with a stranger peasant from Mahala (who seemed willing to help them) could cost their life: “He agreed and brought us into the village, but in the meantime, he told the villagers that we were going to come; they were getting ready to catch us. When we got to the village, some hooligans had begun beating my father, mother and brother; it seemed that they were beating our parents not with malice, but with pleasure as if it were a game they had been waiting for a long time. After deciding they had enough to play with us, they left”.⁸⁵ The same archetypal category includes residents who, “under the pretext of knowing the governor, military commander or mayor”, mock Jews “on a large scale” for their goods; along with them, profiteers from neighbouring villages or, as noted by Popovici, “individuals” from all “corners of the country” to take advantage of that human tragedy⁸⁶. The arrival of colonists brought to *Romanianize* the “abandoned” Jewish (and German) properties triggered tensions with the local would-be profiteers not only in Cernăuți and the surrounding area but also in other parts of Bukovina.⁸⁷ Without exaggerating its dimension, there is also a different perspective on “the others”: the foreigners who, without any

⁸⁴ Dragoș Olaru, *Scrisori din Transnistria (anul 1941)* [Letters from Transnistria (1941)], <http://hauster.de/data/DragosOlaru.pdf> (Accessed on 10.03.2020)

⁸⁵ Shalom Eitan, *Să supraviețuiești...*, p. 25-26.

⁸⁶ Traian Popovici, *Spovedania...*, p. 110-111.

⁸⁷ Ștefan Cristian Ionescu, *“Californian” Colonists...*, p. 134.

previous contact with the refugee, persecuted, *ghettoed* or deported Jews, showed their compassion, solidarity and, in extreme cases, taking risks. Arthur Klinghoffer remembered the ghetto of Storojineț and the non-Jews who helped his family with food: “although many were indifferent, some behaved *friendly* and *right*”.⁸⁸ These evocations of individual cases recorded in documents or testimonies indicate spontaneous human gestures, justified by their attachment to the values of a code of human solidarity, but not systematically researched.

CONCLUSIONS

Because violence is a dynamic and relational process, its trajectories and outcomes cannot be fully understood if the focus is placed solely on one actor: the victim or the perpetrators. Civilians, when they are not targeted by mass violence, but witnessing it, also have choices and strategies to adopt. Civilians across Bukovina reacted differently to the persecution of Jews and the opportunities it brought to victimize or aid them. There were patterns of behaviour that may have gone beyond individual, idiosyncratic differences. Some of them explain why one group provided support and aid to suffering Jewish neighbours, while another group exacerbated the situation, causing deliberate harm, often with gratuitous acts of violence.⁸⁹ Material explanations, opportunism or envy, emotional resentment, as well as empathy, morality, integrity and humanistic principles, reproaches of conscience and demand for labour may be invoked in explaining the extremist or exceptional attitude of civilians towards Jews during the Second World War. Even if the documentary material provides sufficient information to outline the characteristics of the public reaction, from hostility to indifference and compassion, a historiographical re-evaluation of the subject becomes not only useful but also necessary.

⁸⁸ Arthur Klinghoffer, in *Verlorene Kindheit. Copilărie pierdută*, Projektgruppe “Kriegsgräber”, 2017, p. 54, http://www.rsg-roev.de/europaschule/dateien/pdf/kg_verloreneKindheit2017.pdf (Accessed on 15.05.2019)

⁸⁹ Diana Dumitru, Carter Johnson, *Constructing Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation...*, p. 1.